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Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), Vol. 92,

International

Security: Multiple

Actors, Multiple

Threats

The panel was convened at 11:10 a.m., Friday, April 3, by itsChair, JackBeard, who
introduced the panelists: Samuel M. Witten, Assistant Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of
State; Steven e. Kaplow, Assistant General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency; andMarc
Weller, University of Cambridge.
the threat
posed by non-state
countering
actors
in the Proliferation
of Weapons
of Mass Destruction
byJack Beard*
The collapse of the Soviet Union created unprecedented opportunities for non-state
actors toobtain access tonuclear, biological and chemical weapons and theirdeliverymeans,
often referred to as weapons ofmass destruction (WMD). In particular, access to nuclear

weapons and relatedmaterials, technology and expertise has raised serious concerns. As
noted in the 1997 Counterproliferation Review Committee Report toCongress:

The chilling reality is that nuclear materials, technologies, and expertise are more
accessible now than at any time inhistory?due inpart to thedissolution of the Soviet
Union and the region's worsened economic conditions and political instabilities. This

problem is exacerbated by the increasing diffusion of modern technology through the
growth of theworld market, making itharder todetect illicitdiversions ofmaterials and
listof potential proliferators is not limited to stateswith nuclear
technologies_The
weapons ambitions. There are many non-state actors, such as separatists and terrorist
groups, criminal organizations, and individual thieveswho could choose to furthertheir
cause by using fissile or non-fissile (but radioactive) nuclear materials.1
Non-state actors are increasingly making theWMD
threat a domestic as well as an
international concern. Louis Freeh, theDirector of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), recently told theU.S. Congress that"the FBI views theproliferation ofWeapons of
Mass Destruction as a serious and growing threat to our national security_The
FBI has
an
cases
or
in
the
use of
increase
number
of
terrorist
criminal
experienced
involving
WMD....

"2

Recognizing the serious threat thatWMD proliferation poses to both U.S. national
security interestsand internationalpeace and security, theU.S. Government has initiated
several programs throughvarious agencies toprevent non-state actors and otherparties from
obtaining, manufacturing, or retaining such weapons. These programs are consistent with
the continuing primary goal of the United States: preventing proliferation.3 The U.S.
Department of Defense plays a key role in supporting all facets of national

'AssociateDeputy GeneralCounsel (International
Affairs),U.S. DepartmentofDefense; Adjunct
Professorof Law, Georgetown UniversityLaw Center,Washington, D.C. The views presentedare
thoseof theauthorand do not necessarily reflecttheofficialpolicy or position of theDepartment of
Defense or theU.S. Government.
11997Under Sec'y of Def. Counterproliferation Program Rev. Committee Ann. Rep. to
Cong.,

at 3-2,3-3.

2BeforetheHouse AppropriationsComm. on Commerce, Justice,State, Judiciary,and Related
Agencies, 105thCongress (March 5, 1998) (prepared statementof Louis J.Freeh, Director, FBI)
(available inLEXIS, NEWS Library,FEDNEW file).
3OfficeoftheSecretaryof Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 53 (Nov. 1997).
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counterproliferationpolicy, including assisting other countries incountering theproliferation
threatpresented by non-state actors through internationalproliferation prevention programs.
Among these early proliferation prevention or counterproliferation initiativeswere
various activities under the "Nunn-Lugar" or Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Program.4 Through theCTR Program, theDepartment of Defense has provided assistance
to the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) for various authorized purposes, including
<l[p]rograms to prevent theproliferation ofweapons, weapons components, and weapons
related technology and expertise."5
Early CTR counterproliferation activities included assistance toRussia in facilitating
the safe and secure storage and transportation of nuclear weapons and improving systems

of control, accounting and physical protection of nuclear material. In addition, the
Department of Defense concluded CTR export control agreements with counterpart
ministries in countries such as Ukraine6 and Kazakhstan.7 These agreements addressed the

WMD proliferation threatposed by non-state actors by providing guidance on establishing
and implementing export control regimes; improving export enforcement programs;
providing classroom and on-site trainingforofficials involved in licensing, enforcement and
other activities; advising on the drafting of export control legislation and implementing
regulations; and providing computerized systems and related training to improve tracking
of controlled items.
In recent years,

the character, scope and size of several U.S. Government
counterproliferation programs have significantly changed, largely in response to the
increased threatposed by non-state actors. These changes are reflected in the list of new
countries now eligible to receive U.S. counterproliferation assistance, new legislative
authorities enacted by theU.S. Congress, and new forms of assistance.
For many years, the CTR Program provided assistance forWMD destruction and
counterproliferation activities solely to the four FSU states inwhich nuclear weapons were
located (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine). However, on March 4, 1997, seven
additional FSU stateswere certified as eligible to receive CTR assistance.8 CTR assistance

CTR legislation,sponsoredby SenatorsSam Nunn andRichard Lugar, was enacted in
4The first
1991.Congress has amended and expanded this initialefforton an annual basis. See SovietNuclear
ThreatReductionAct of 1991,22 U.S.C. ? 2551 note;Former Soviet Union DemilitarizationAct of
1992,22U.S.C. ?? 5901-5931; Cooperative ThreatReductionAct of 1993,22 U.S.C. ?? 5951-5958;
National Defense AuthorizationAct forFiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, titleXII; National
Defense AuthorizationAct forFiscal Year 1996,Pub. L. No. 104-106, titleXII, 22 U.S.C. ? 5955,
note;National Defense AuthorizationAct forFiscal Year 1997,Pub. L. No. 104-201, titleXV; and
National Defense AuthorizationAct forFiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-85, titleXIV. DoD is
responsibleforthemanagementof theCTR Programand allCTR fundingisprovided exclusivelyfrom
DepartmentofDefense appropriations.Since its inceptionin 1991,Congress has authorizedover $2
billion for theCTR Program.
522U.S.C. ? 5952(b)(3).
Between theU.S. DepartmentofDefense and theExpert and Technical Committee
^Agreement
of theCabinet ofMinisters ofUkraine Concerning theProvision ofAssistance toUkraine Related to
theEstablishmentof an Export Control System toPrevent theProliferationofWMD fromUkraine,
Dec. 5, 1993,StateDep't No. 94-39, 1993WL 642434 (enteredintoforceDec. 31, 1993).
Ministry ofDefense of theRepublic
'AgreementBetween theU.S. DepartmentofDefense and the
ofKazakhstan Concerning theProvision ofAssistance to theRepublic ofKazakhstan Related to the
EstablishmentofExportControl Systems toPrevent theProliferationofWMD, Dec. 13, 1993,State
Dep't No. 94-33, 1993WL 642423.
8OnMarch 4,1997, theSecretaryof State, actingon behalf of thePresident under ? 1203(d) of
theCooperative Threat Reduction Act, titleXII of Pub. L. No. 103-160, 22 U.S.C. ? 5952(d);
XIV ofPub. L. No. 102-484,
? 1412(d) of theFormerSovietUnion DemilitarizationAct of 1992, title
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in these newly certified FSU states has focused on counterproliferation programs and the
promotion ofmilitary and defense relations. Since March 1997,major agreements have been
concluded by theUnited States with several of these newly certified FSU states, creating a
bilateral legal framework for theprovision of CTR and other assistance for a variety of new

counterproliferation activities.9
One of thefirstnewly certifiedFSU states to conclude a counterproliferation agreement
with theUnited States was theRepublic of Georgia. This action was strongly supported by
theClinton administration as part of a "strong commitment to assisting Georgia's efforts to
address non-proliferation and export control concerns and to develop a modern military
under civilian control and a viable border guard."10Noting the importance of the expansion
of CTR and related programs to theRepublic of Georgia, Secretary ofDefense William Co
hen remarked after signing theGeorgia Counterproliferation Agreement, on July 17,1997:

Today we're taking a historic step of extending the cooperative threat reduction plan
and program and other defense cooperation plans to Georgia. The CTR program has
forged broad-ranging programs in the former Soviet Union to help reduce the risk of
proliferation. The extension of thisprogram is going to ensure thatGeorgia remains a
"sturdy brick" in thewall holding back the spread ofweapons ofmass destruction.11
The Georgia Counterproliferation Agreement reflects a new emphasis on creating
viable border guard and export control organizations through new types of assistance
projects. For example, under this agreement, theDepartment of Defense and theGeorgian
State Border Guards recently concluded a CTR Implementing Agreement to provide patrol
boats and related training toGeorgia to preventWMD proliferation along Georgia's Black
Sea coast.12 Increasingly sophisticated equipment and technology are being provided to
participating states to help detect and preventWMD proliferation.

22 U.S.C. ? 5902(d); and ? 502 of theFREEDOM SupportAct, Pub. L. No. 102-511, 22 U.S.C. ?
5852; certifiedthe following countriesas eligible to receive CTR and FREEDOM SupportAct
assistance for thefirsttime: theRepublic ofArmenia, theAzerbaijani Republic, theRepublic of
Georgia, theKy rgzRepublic, theRepublic ofMoldova, Turkmenistan,and theRepublic ofUzbekistan.
(AlthoughKazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine were also certified,Belarus andTajikistan were not.)
Certification

on file with

the ASIL.

^Recent agreements include:Agreement Between theU.S. Department of Defense and the
Ministry of Defense of theRepublic of Uzbekistan Concerning Cooperation in theArea of the
DismantlementofWMD, thePreventionofProliferationofWMD, and thePromotionofDefense and
MilitaryRelations, June27,1997, StateDep't No. 97-124,1997 WL 574350; AgreementBetween the
U.S. Department ofDefense and theMinistry ofDefense of theRepublic ofMoldova Concerning
ofWMD, and thePromotionofDefense and
Cooperation in theArea of thePreventionofProliferation
MilitaryRelations, June23,1997, StateDep't No. 97-123,1997 WL 574349; AgreementBetween the
United States ofAmerica and Georgia Concerning Cooperation in theArea of thePrevention of
ProliferationofWMD, and thePromotionofDefense andMilitary Relations, July 17,1997 (entered
into force Nov. 10, 1997), State Dep't No. 98-1, 1997 WL 813208 [hereinafterGeorgia
Agreement].
Counterproliferation
StatementonRepublic ofGeorgia-United StatesRelations, 33Weekly Comp. pres. Doc.
,0Joint
1105 (July 18,1997).
1x
Defense DepartmentBriefing,FederalNews Service, July 17,1997,available inLEXIS, NEWS
Library,FEDNEW File.
^ImplementingAgreementBetween theDepartmentofDefense of theUnited States ofAmerica
and the State Department of the State Border Guards of Georgia Concerning the Provision of
Assistance toGeorgia of ExportControl Systems toPrevent theProliferationofWMD, Jan.30,1998
(enteredintoforceFeb. 17, 1998).Agreement on filewith theASIL.
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Recent counterproliferation agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Uzbekistan also
reflect the expansion of programs enacted by theU.S. Congress to address theWMD threat
posed by non-state actors. One such program is the International Border Security (IBS)

program.13 Also referred to as the "DoP/U.S. Customs Service Counterproliferation
Program," the IBS Program ismanaged by theU.S. Department ofDefense in consultation
with theU.S. Customs Service. Its stated purpose is to "train and equip customs officers and
border guards in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and theBaltic states to prevent,

deter, and investigate incidents involving the traffickingof [WMD] and relatedmaterials."14
Broad language supporting the IBS and other programs is found in each of the recently
and Uzbekistan.15
concluded counterproliferation agreements with Georgia, Moldova
as
the
these
of
the
Defense,
agreements,
Through
designated executive agent
Department
for theUnited States, seeks to furtherits stated objectives for the IBS Program: to assist in
establishing a professional cadre of border enforcement personnel inparticipating states; to
enhance the ability of customs and border guards in those states to detect and interdict
WMD
and relatedmaterials; and to establish long-termofficialworking relationships between U.S.
Government agencies and customs/border guards in those states.16These objectives are

particularlywell suited to respond to the threatposed by non-state actors in theunauthorized
transferofWMD
in these countries.
Another recently authorized program, theDoD/FBI Counterproliferation Program,17
complements the IBS Program by training and equipping the officials responsible for the
interdictionofWMD in theBaltic states,Eastern Europe and theFSU. Specifically tailored
to deter non-state actors, the program is authorized to "expand and improveUnited States
efforts todeter thepossible proliferation of and acquisition ofweapons ofmass destruction
... inEastern Europe, the Baltic countries, and states of the former
by organized crime
Soviet Union."18 To achieve these goals, thisjoint DoD/FBI program assists in developing
enforcementmechanisms to deter, prevent and investigateWMD threats and incidents.
While CTR assistance is restrictedby law toFSU states, assistance under theDoD/U.S.
Customs and DoD/FBI Counterproliferation Programs is also available to theBaltic states
and Eastern Europe. For this reason, the United States is actively seeking to conclude
agreements with these states to assist them in countering the threatposed by non-state actors
related to the unauthorized transfer of WMD. The first country in Eastern Europe to
conclude such a counterproliferation agreement with theUnited States was Romania.19

National Defense AuthorizationAct forFiscal Year 1997,Pub. L. No. 104-201, ? 1424.
,3The
theDepartmentofDefense to"carryout programsforassistingcustomsofficials
authorizes
? 1424(a)
and borderguard officials in the independentstatesof theformerSoviet Union, theBaltic states,and
of nuclear,
and transportation
othercountriesof EasternEurope inpreventingunauthorized transfer
related
materials."
and
and
chemical
weapons
biological,
"Proliferation: Threat and Response, supra note 3, at 57.
15Arecentlyconcludedagreementalso provides assistance under thisprogramtoKazakhstan. See
AgreementBetween theU.S. Department ofDefense and theMinistry ofDefense of theRepublic of
Kazakhstan ConcerningCooperation intheArea of thePreventionof ProliferationofWMD, Nov. 18,
1997, StateDep't No. 98-5, 1997WL 813242.
"Proliferation: Threat and Response, supra note 3, at 57.
National DefenseAuthorizationAct forFiscal Year 1995,Pub. L. No. 103-337, ? 1504(e).
,7The
made available forthisinitiative.
ReprogrammedprioryearDepartmentofDefense fundswere recently
,8Pub.L.No. 103-337, ? 1504(e)(3)(a).
Between theU.S. Government and theGovernment of Romania Concerning
19Agreement
ofWMD, and thePromotionofDefense andMilitary
Cooperation in theArea ofCounterproliferation
on
March
30,1998
Relations, signed
(pending entryintoforce).Agreement on filewith theASIL.
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Speaking at thePentagon after the agreementwith Romania was signed, onMarch 30,1998,
Secretary of Defense Cohen said:
The spread of deadly chemical and biological weapons or nuclear weapons pose[s] a
and
serious threatto theUnited States and to all peace-loving countries_Romania
theUnited States realize thatwe have todo all thatwe can to prevent terroristsor rogue
nations from acquiring and using such weapons,
us partners in that campaign.20

and this agreement is going tomake

Although public attention often focuses on more prominent U.S. Government efforts
to deal with rogue states that already possess or are developing WMD,
the proliferation
threatposed by non-state actors is real and growing. The cooperative measures required to
address this threatoften involve long-term and systematic efforts to train and equip the
customs officials, border guards and law enforcement personnel of foreign states, and

improve the export control regimes in those states.While these effortsdo not often capture
the public spotlight, they are highly significant. Through such international proliferation
prevention programs, theU.S. Government is forging importantnew relationships with
foreign states tomore effectively address theWMD threatposed by non-state actors.
The Changing

Environment
to nontraditional

for Forcible
Threats

Responses

byMarc Weller
Threats
So-called nontraditional threats are traditional in at least one respect: in terms of the
destructive potential thatmay be unleashed ifever they are implemented. The possible use
of weapons ofmass destruction by non-state entities or so-called rogue states is an often
quoted example. And perhaps such threatsare not as unrealistic as some might hope. The
use of chemical agents by fringegroups in theTokyo underground system have given us a
foretaste of what may be to come. Only a few days ago, theUnited Kingdom government
issued an advisory to customs posts around the country, indicating thatwarnings had been

received about the importationof anthrax bombs, disguised induty-free containers, for use
by Iraqi groups or, indeed, possibly by the Iraqi government.
This presentation will focus on the potential use of forcible responses to so-called
nontraditional threats.Nontraditional threats, one presumes, are being addressed by this
panel precisely because they pose risks as grave as some of the traditional threats to
internationalpeace and security, and, in view of the risks, the use or threat of force as a
remedy has already been proposed on a few occasions, and implemented in relation to Iraq
and Libya. Iwill try to identifysome trends in state practice in this respect, especially U.S.
practice. Iwill argue that thepresent course of action is one thatmay undermine, rather than
strengthen, the existing structuresof international law and organization and may thus be,
ultimately, counterproductive.
Threats are considered nontraditional, either:
because they involve nontraditional means of violence, such as weapons ofmass
destruction, environmental threatsor possibly nonviolent practices that can have

2C'Defense
Department Briefing, Federal News Service,Mar. 30, 1998, available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library,FEDNEW File.
'DeputyDirector,Centre of InternationalStudies,UniversityofCambridge.

